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ABSTRACT 
Firms that change their listing from the less regulated AIM to the more regulated main 
section of the London Stock Exchange exhibit positive abnormal returns on the 
announcement day. For firms moving in the opposite direction, both announcement and 
implementation day abnormal returns are negative. Following implementation, the pattern is 
reversed for both categories of firm. We show that differences in liquidity, conventional risk 
factors and in medium to long term firm survival rates between the two listing regimes do 
not explain the observed patterns of returns, suggesting that the answer lies in the different 
bonding requirements of the two market segments and an agency risk premium. 
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1. Introduction 
Determining the level of corporate governance regulation that balances the costs of 
disclosure and compliance requirements with the benefits of a stock exchange listing is an 
important and challenging problem. The “bonding hypothesis” proposed by Coffee (1999) 
and Stulz (1999) suggests that firms can bond themselves to good corporate governance by 
listing on a foreign stock exchange with higher governance standards and thus constrain 
insiders from appropriating wealth from minority shareholders. Likewise, Skaife, Collins 
and LaFond (2004) demonstrate that a firm’s corporate governance attributes influence both 
its systematic and non-systematic risk and, hence, its cost of capital, implying the existence 
of “agency risk” as an asset pricing variable.   
Firm managers may mitigate agency risk by committing the firm to greater bonding, thus 
signalling to investors that agency costs will be easier to control. One way of doing this is to 
seek a listing on an exchange that requires greater bonding commitments: either by a cross 
listing, or by a migration. Motivations for cross listing have been examined in a number of 
studies (e.g. Hail and Leuz, 2009; Lel and Miller, 2008; Doige, Karolyi, and Stulz 2007; 
Pagano, Roell and Zechner, 2002; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999; Foerster 
and Karolyi, 1999; Amira and Muzere, 2011). The primary focus of these studies is firms 
that list on, or migrate to, a more regulated exchange, rather than on firms that migrate from 
a more to a less regulated exchange.  
The present study falls into a related category of studies that examine migrations between 
different regulatory and governance regimes within the same geographic or legal 
jurisdiction (e.g. Leitterstorf, Nicoletti and Winkler, 2008; Jenkinson and Ramadorai 2013; 
Vismara, Paleari and Ritter, 2012). Specifically, we investigate migrations between two 
sections of the London Stock Exchange (LSE): the Official List (main section) and the 
smaller Alternative Investment Market (AIM). An advantage of focusing on firms that 
transfer between different tiers of the same market is that we automatically control for the 
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legal protection afforded to shareholders and the stock exchange trading technology. A 
within-country study such as ours also reveals the ability of a stock exchange to influence 
the level of investor protection over and above that provided by existing law. 
We define agency risk as the ex-ante uncertainty surrounding the nature and magnitude 
of agency costs. Unlike conventional risk factors such as market, size, style, momentum and 
liquidity, agency risk arises from the information asymmetry between agents who control 
information about the firm and outside investors (principals) who make capital allocation 
decisions. We argue that by its nature, such risk is firm specific and difficult to parameterise 
with a known probability distribution. Principals do not know ex-ante what, if any, 
information is being withheld by agents; in other words, they do not know what they do not 
know, so we conceive of this risk as Knightian uncertainty (Knight, 1985 [1921]).
1
 The 
entrepreneur earns a profit as the reward for bearing this uncertainty by agreeing 
predetermined contractual obligations with labourers and other resource suppliers in 
exchange for uncertain residual returns (Knight, 1985 [1921], pp 269 - 270). As an 
entrepreneur’s business develops and a trading history emerges, the balance may shift from 
uncertainty towards insurable risk – where possible outcomes can be classified and 
subjective probabilities assigned to them – although uncertainty is never eliminated and the 
shift can be reversed (Knight, 1985 [1921], pp. 215 – 216). Firms listed on the AIM are 
typically early stage ventures, so we posit that agency risk will be greater than for firms 
listed on the Official List. Firms migrating between the two bonding regimes are subjected 
to a change in bonding obligations that directly causes a change to the level of agency risk 
faced by their investors: in the low bonding regime of the AIM, agency risk is higher, 
whereas in the high bonding regime of the Official List it is lower.  
  
                                                 
1
 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for guiding this characterisation of Knightian uncertainty. 
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We argue that when agency risk increases, investors demand a premium on the cost of 
capital over and above that captured by standard models such as the CAPM or Fama and 
French (1993) model. We base this proposition on the grounds that agency risk is driven by 
firm specific characteristics rather than macro events and is not necessarily constrained by 
firm size, leverage or market to book ratios. In addition, the agency risk of individual firms 
is likely to persist over multi-year periods. However, we argue that a listing migration 
between the two segments of the London market triggers a change in the level of agency 
risk perceived by investors, given the different bonding requirements, which results in a 
change to the cost of capital to reflect the new agency risk premium. The dividend discount 
model implies that in the absence of changes in cash flows a change in the cost of capital 
will change firm value. Ceteris paribus, subsequent returns will reflect the new cost of 
capital. Thus, a unique contribution of our study is to examine the effect of changes in the 
level of agency risk on firm value and the cost of capital. 
We test our hypothesis by studying returns surrounding the announcement and 
implementation of migrations between two sections of the LSE. Returns attributable to the 
agency risk premium are identified using a return generating model that, in addition to 
market, size and book to market risk factors, also controls for industry and liquidity risk. 
The latter is measured by the bid-ask-spread, which also controls for time variation in 
information asymmetry (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). Though we cannot measure agency 
risk directly, as it is inherently unobservable, by including in our model the other possible 
explanatory variables identified in the asset pricing literature we are able to attribute the 
residual (abnormal) returns not explained by our model to the agency risk premium.  
Our study makes five contributions to the literature. First, we draw attention to the role of 
agency risk in explaining the differential returns of firms in the two listing regimes. Second, 
we use daily returns as opposed to the weekly returns typically used in other studies, and a 
benchmark returns model that controls for industry residual returns and the possibility of an 
interaction between market risk and change of listing status. Third unlike other studies that 
4 
 
compare migrations between market segments (for example, Baker and Edelman 1992a; 
Baker and Edelman 1992b; Bacmann, Dubois and Ertur 2002; Clyde, Schultz and Zaman 
1997; Carvalho and Pennacchi 2012; Lamba and Arif 1997; Lamba and Khan 1999; Tse and 
Devos 2004; Leitterstorf, Nicoletti and Winkler 2008, Gerakos, Lang and Maffett 2013; 
Jenkinson and Ramadorai 2012; Vismara, Paleari and Ritter 2013), we control for both time 
and cross sectional variations in three proxies for liquidity: the bid ask spread, standardised 
trading volume and the free float
2
. Fourth, we empirically examine changes in risk and 
return resulting from changes in listing status. Fifth, complementing Espenlaub, Khurshed 
and Mohamed (2012) we find that while short term survival rates are somewhat higher for 
firms seeking promotion, the medium to long term survival rates are identical for both 
categories of firm. This suggests that differences in bankruptcy risk do not drive the 
observed return patterns, implying that differences in agency risk are responsible.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we consider the UK 
institutional context with respect to the LSE and AIM. The theoretical background and 
hypotheses are detailed in section 3, followed by a discussion of the data characteristics in 
section 4. The results and conclusions are presented in sections 5 and 6 respectively. 
2. The London Stock Exchange and AIM 
Taken together the two sections of the LSE have characteristics which make them 
particularly suited to a study of the influence of the regulatory environment on the cost of 
capital. For example, although the main market of the LSE ranks highly in terms of the level 
of investor protection provided (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997; La 
Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and 
Shleifer, 1999; Bebchuk, 2005; Bebchuk, 2007; Becht, Franks, and Rossi, 2009) the AIM 
section of the LSE is, arguably, one of the most lightly regulated markets in the developed 
                                                 
2
 While Lamba and Arif (1997) and Clyde, Schultz and Zaman (1997) do examine cumulative abnormal 
trading volume for listing promotions on the Japanese and US stock markets respectively, they only consider 
unidirectional switches. 
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World. Additionally, more than twice as many firms transfer from the main market to the 
AIM as transfer in the other direction. It is unusual to see such a high number of firms 
seeking to migrate from a more regulated exchange to a less regulated exchange within the 
same jurisdiction. In fact, on many junior exchanges, it is either not possible for them to 
accept firms from their more senior counterparts, or else such an occurrence is considered 
exceptional. Firms listed on most multi-tier exchanges typically seek promotion to a more 
senior exchange, or, if delisting, seek a complete removal of their quotation.  
The less stringent governance, reporting and listing requirements faced by AIM firms 
compared to the main market is a characteristic that, arguably, results in a higher cost of 
capital. Firms listed on the main market are subject to the “comply or explain” principle of 
the UK Corporate Governance Code, formerly known as the Combined Code (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2010).  Although the efficacy of the “comply or explain” principle may 
be questioned (e.g. MacNeil and Li, 2006) AIM firms do not have to abide by it; instead 
they only have to apply the AIM Rules for Firms (London Stock Exchange, 2010). These 
contain provisions concerning the conduct of directors and the disclosure of remuneration 
and other information that are significantly less onerous than the UK Corporate Governance 
Code. Following the Enron scandal and the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) in 
2002, the cost of listing in the US increased relative to the London markets (among others) 
making London markets potentially more attractive locations for foreign firms. In fact, 
Piotroski and Srinivasan (2008) find that large foreign firms are no less likely to choose the 
US market over London, but smaller firms are more likely to consider a UK listing, and in 
particular an AIM listing over a US listing, post SOX. This suggests that for smaller firms, 
the lower cost of maintaining a listing on AIM potentially outweighs the higher cost of 
capital, including higher agency costs.   
Although the UK Corporate Governance Code does not apply to AIM firms, 
shareholders are nevertheless provided with a safeguard in the form of a requirement for 
each company to have a Nominated Adviser or ‘Nomad’ approved by the LSE. Generally 
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investment banks, accountancy firms or corporate finance advisory firms, they are 
responsible for advising on compliance with the AIM Rules for Firms (London Stock 
Exchange, 2010) and promoting good practice. For example, a company seeking to join 
AIM must appoint a Nomad to help the applicant come to the market. These rules also 
require Nomads to “consider, with the directors of an applicant, the adoption of appropriate 
corporate governance measures” (p. 17) and they state that Nomads must also be satisfied 
that a company has in place “sufficient systems, procedures and controls” (p. 18) to comply 
with the AIM Rules for Firms. Nomads must also comply with the AIM Rules for Nominated 
Advisers (London Stock Exchange, 2007a) which require them to contact the AIM 
regulation team if they believe that a firm for which they act is no longer appropriate for 
AIM (Rule 14, p. 8). The Nomad is thus central to the AIM’s regulatory model, acting in effect 
as gatekeeper, adviser, and regulator. The possibility of facing disciplinary action for failing to 
properly assess a company’s suitability for AIM, or for tolerating post-listing misdemeanours, 
should compel Nomads to perform their roles diligently. The AIM can thus be regarded as a 
“reputational market” in which investors rely on the character of Nomads as a proxy for the 
quality of listed firms, rather than on the market’s regulations (Mendoza, 2008). However, the 
Nomad-client relationship is complicated by the fact that the Nomad is hired and paid for by the 
client, leading Gerakos, Lang and Maffett (2013) to characterise the system as “private 
regulation” [this is more or less repeated again on p. 12]. They also question the amount of 
oversight provided by Nomads in practice given that the requirements for admission as a Nomad 
are “quite light”. 
The LSE does not typically disclose Nomad censures for breaches of the AIM Rules for 
Nominated Advisers, preferring to deliver disciplinary action privately. However, three 
censures have been made public since the AIM launched in 1995, indicating that the LSE is 
holding Nomads to account but also suggesting that reliance on Nomads may give investors 
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undue confidence in AIM firms.
3
 The first censure was disclosed in October 2007 when the 
Nomad Nabarro Wells was fined £250,000 (London Stock Exchange, 2007b). The LSE 
reviewed the conduct of Nabarro Wells during 2006, selecting seven AIM firms for which it 
acted as Nomad, and finding material breaches of AIM rules in respect of five of them. 
While exonerating the firms, it found that Nabarro Wells had acted without “due skill and 
care”, had “failed to undertake the necessary level of due diligence to assess the 
appropriateness of certain firms for admission to AIM” including one “company’s inability 
to raise the required funds on admission which was necessary to achieve the assumed 
growth projections included in its working capital report” (London Stock Exchange, 2007b, 
p. 4) 
The second censure was published in June 2009 when the Nomad Blue Oar Securities 
(since renamed as Astaire Securities) was fined £225,000 for failing to question the 
accuracy of its client's announcements and to assess its ongoing suitability for an AIM 
listing (London Stock Exchange, 2009). Though not disclosed in the Disciplinary Notice, 
the client was identified in the press as the company Worthington Nicholls Group plc, 
whose business involves installing air conditioning and ventilation in hotels (Taylor, 2009). 
Among the announcements by Worthington Nicholls that Blue Oar knew were inaccurate or 
misleading, but failed to prevent, was a reference to a “high percentage of recurring revenue” 
when orders received had actually fallen from £932,077 to £164,580 (a decrease noted by 
Blue Oar in an email to the client) and a reference to discussions for potential deals with 
“five hotel chains, which, in aggregate, own in excess of 90 hotels” when in reality 
Worthington Nicholls was in contractual negotiations with just one hotel from each of the 
five chains (London Stock Exchange, 2009, p 7).  
                                                 
3
 The LSE has also censured and fined some AIM listed companies without taking action against their Nomads.  
For more details see Blackwell (2009), Mallin and Ow-Yong (2010) and Appendix II in Gerakos, Lang and 
Maffett (2013). 
8 
 
The third case was disclosed in December 2011 when the disciplinary committee of AIM 
publicly censured the Nomad Seymour Pierce and imposed a record fine of £400,000 for 
breaches of four Nomad rules in relation to two client firms that occurred in 2010 (London 
Stock Exchange, 2011c). The LSE had conducted a routine visit to review Seymour Pierce’s 
conduct as a nominated adviser in May 2010, as a result of which various concerns and 
recommendations had been raised about its standard of work. However, the LSE “did not 
initially receive from Seymour Pierce the level of co-operation it had expected or required in 
relation to the matters it had raised” (London Stock Exchange, 2011c, p 4). Further 
investigation then resulted in the public censure notice, which discloses that in one case 
Seymour Pierce failed to provide proper advice and guidance to a client in relation to the 
client’s obligation to inform the market promptly of material changes in its financial 
situation. The client’s share price rose by 80 per cent on news of a healthy order book, only 
for it to be placed into administration three weeks later, having failed to disclose that the 
directors had issued a short-term working capital loan to the company four weeks earlier. In 
the other case it failed to carry out proper due diligence on a client planning to list on AIM. 
The most troubling aspect of this censure is that at the time of its announcement Seymour 
Pierce was the largest Nomad on AIM, advising 74 firms.  
The diligence with which Nomads perform their duties is questioned by Mallin and Ow-
Yong (2010). Based on interviews with two Nomads that advised more than 160 AIM firms, 
accounting for more than 10% of UK incorporated AIM firms at the time, they formed the 
impression that the brokering services also provided by these Nomads to their clients was 
“far more important” than their role as a Nomad, which they tended to view in a “passive 
capacity”. The opinions of the 19 directors of AIM firms interviewed by Mallin and Ow-
Yong (2010) was mixed, with some indicating that their Nomad had been very supportive 
whilst others indicated that they had received little support. The general view formed by the 
authors from interviews with four institutional investors is that the Nomad is not a 
significant factor in the decision to invest in an AIM company. A survey of 20 institutional 
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investors conducted in 2010 by Baker Tilly found that as many as 70% of them believed that 
further increases in regulation of the AIM market were required (Baker Tilly, 2011). The 
composition of the board of directors, in particular the presence and role of non-executive 
directors, was an area where some of these investors saw grounds for tightening of corporate 
governance requirements, with half of them judging the non-executive directors in AIM 
firms to be “not very effective”. 
Although the need to ‘comply or explain’ with the UK Corporate Governance Code is 
not obligatory for AIM firms, as a minimum they are encouraged by the LSE to follow the 
Corporate Governance Guidelines for Smaller Quoted Firms, produced by the Quoted 
Firms Alliance (QCA), a trade members’ organisation whose work focuses on issues 
affecting small and mid-cap quoted firms outside the FTSE 350. These guidelines are based 
on the provisions of the UK Corporate Governance Code but are less prescriptive and 
detailed as they are tailored to the needs of smaller, growing firms.  Irrespective of whether 
AIM firms adopt these basic rules from the QCA or opt for compliance with relevant 
aspects of the UK Corporate Governance Code, the QCA Guidelines recommend that a 
corporate governance statement is published each year, either in the annual report and 
accounts or on the website. At a minimum this statement should describe how each of the 12 
guidelines for good practice contained in the QCA Guidelines is put into effect. 
Like the UK Corporate Governance Code, the QCA Guidelines specify the need for 
independent non-executive directors, for separating the role of chairman and chief executive, 
for establishing remuneration and audit committees made up of non-executive directors, 
setting up a nomination committee to recommend board appointments, and establishing a 
dialogue with shareholders. However, the QCA Guidelines are generally less demanding: 
for example, a minimum of two independent non-executive directors are recommended by 
the QCA Guidelines, one of whom may be the Chairman if deemed independent at the time 
of appointment, whereas the UK Corporate Governance Code recommends that 
independent non-executive directors should comprise at least half the board, excluding the 
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Chairman.
4
 In the absence of a mandatory requirement to adopt a particular corporate 
governance code, directors of an AIM company have a degree of flexibility and discretion in 
their approach to corporate governance. With guidance from their Nomad, AIM directors 
can put in place systems that balance the needs and resources of what is often a smaller, 
growing business against the need to have an effective governance system that will deliver 
transparency and trust between the board and the shareholders. However, if they fail to 
strike the right balance between the proportionality of governance systems and their 
effectiveness, they risk undermining shareholder confidence. 
Over and above compliance (or otherwise) with corporate governance guidelines, AIM 
firms have to abide by the rules for admission to the market and thereafter comply with a 
number of continuing obligations to maintain their listing. In Europe, there are two legally 
defined ways to access the capital market: ‘EU-regulated markets’ and markets regulated by 
the stock exchanges themselves (‘exchange regulated markets’). As the AIM is an 
‘exchange regulated market’, the rules are set by the LSE and, as we have seen, are based on 
the company’s relationship with its Nomad. In contrast, the main market of the LSE is an 
‘EU-regulated market’ that requires firms to produce a full prospectus for approval by the 
UK Listing Authority (UKLA) and then to abide by the continuing obligations which apply 
to all admitted firms, such as ensuring that price sensitive information is made available to 
all investors at the same time. Both the admissions criteria and the continuing obligations 
are significantly less onerous for AIM firms than for main market firms (and our analysis of 
the published explanations for migrations in Table 1 indicates that ‘cost savings, 
simplifications of reporting/regulation’ is mentioned by a sizeable number of the firms 
moving down to the AIM). For example, whereas main market firms must have a three-year 
trading record and ensure a minimum of 25 per cent of the shares are in public hands after 
                                                 
4
 Though for smaller companies - i.e. those not included in the FTSE 350 throughout the year immediately 
prior to the reporting year - the UK Corporate Governance Code requires at least two independent non-
executive directors. 
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flotation, AIM firms require no trading record and there is no minimum free float. As a 
result many firms listed on the AIM have concentrated shareholdings. It is in fact possible to 
create a new company and have it listed on the AIM within two to three weeks, provided a 
Nomad can be found. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
There is considerable overlap in size between firms listed on the AIM and on the main 
market. For example, after excluding investment firms and firms with a market 
capitalization of less than £1m, on 31 March 2011 there were 574 UK firms with ordinary 
shares listed on the main market: of these, 421 (73%) had a market capitalization less than 
the £1.39bn market capitalization of the largest firm listed on the AIM (London Stock 
Exchange 2011a). With no prescribed governance requirements in the AIM Rules for Firms, 
AIM firms may look to the main market’s UK Corporate Governance Code for guidance on 
key aspects of governance. However, Snell and O’Brien (2008) find that whilst 77% of the 
Top 100 AIM firms by size comply with some aspects of this Code, only 3% choose to fully 
adopt it.  
Board composition is an area where many AIM firms are weak when benchmarked 
against the UK Corporate Governance Code, which requires that boards have a balance of 
executive and non-executive directors. Only half of medium sized AIM firms (with a market 
capitalisation between £40 million and £100 million) that were sampled by Snell and 
O’Brien (2008) were found to have a majority of non-executive directors on their board, 
though this rose to 71% for the Top 100. This is important given evidence that shareholder 
wealth increases when the proportion of outside directors increases (eg Rosenstein and 
Wyatt, 1990). Whereas the UK Corporate Governance Code requires firms to separate the 
roles of Board Chairman and CEO, up to 45% of AIM firms were found to combine these 
roles (Snell and O’Brien, 2008). So doing creates a conflict of interest which has been found 
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to reduce firm performance, increase CEO compensation and reduce the sensitivity of CEO 
turnover to firm performance (Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999; Goyal and Park, 2002). 
Many AIM firms have never made a profit and can be characterized as pure plays on a 
particular technology or business plan. As a result, they may be perceived as riskier than 
firms listed on the main market, which generally have a longer trading history, a more 
demonstrable record of profitability and a higher free float. When AIM firms are able to 
demonstrate a sustainable record of profitability and a market capitalization exceeding 
£500m they are encouraged by the LSE to transfer their listing to the main market, but this 
is not obligatory (Arcot, Black, and Owen, 2007, p. 39). In fact, we find that more than 
twice as many firms move from the main market to the AIM than move in the opposite 
direction, while the overlap in size between firms on both exchanges suggests that many 
firms choose not to seek promotion, even if they meet the criteria. Overall the listing 
migrations comprise transactions that are economically significant: the total value of firms 
moving up to the Official List over the study period from January 1996 through February 
2011 was £22.3bn while the corresponding figure for firms moving down to the AIM was 
£4.8bn. 
Although some firms on the main market may be tempted to move to the AIM to take 
advantage of its less prescriptive regime (“regulatory arbitrage”) the LSE expect both 
nomads and institutional investors to ensure that firms raise their corporate governance 
standards as they increase in size (Arcot, Black and Owen, 2007, p. 23). However, 
investigations of corporate governance disclosure among AIM firms have uncovered a 
variety of corporate governance practices, with larger AIM firms not necessarily providing 
better governance (Mallin and Ow-Yong, 1998, 2008; Snell and O’Brien, 2008). 
Notwithstanding the AIM rules for Firms and the UK Listing Authority (UKLA) rules, our 
findings indicate that firms often provide very little notice or justification for a listing 
change and shareholders are often not given the opportunity to vote for, or against, the 
change. 
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In their comparison of the AIM with the NASDAQ and OTC Bulletin Board (OTCBB) in 
the US and the LSE Main Market in the UK, covering the period June 27th 1995 to 
December 31st 2008, Gerakos, Lang and Maffett (2013) find that AIM firms produce lower 
returns, have lower liquidity and are significantly more likely to fail. The authors highlight 
the AIM’s more relaxed regulatory environment and characterise it as “much more like a 
landing pad for struggling firms than a launching pad for highfliers” (p. 24). The regulatory 
environment in which AIM firms operate thus poses greater agency risks for investors, so 
firms that use the AIM as a launching pad for the LSE are willing to incur greater regulatory 
costs to bond themselves to investors when they migrate upwards, while those LSE firms 
using the AIM as a landing pad are trading off greater agency costs against the reduced 
burden of regulation and disclosure when they migrate downwards. 
The possibility that the lower standard of regulation on the AIM attracts lower quality 
firms that are unable to list in more regulated markets was investigated by Nielsson (2012). 
His results show that firms listed on AIM, although smaller in size, are equivalent in terms 
of profitability, growth and leverage to firms listed in the NYSE and NASDAQ exchanges 
in the U.S. and in two Continental European exchanges (the Deutsche Börse and Euronext). 
He also demonstrates that the delisting pattern is the same across these markets and 
concludes that the AIM does not cater to lower quality firms. 
As well as sending signals about future agency costs and firm performance, a decision to 
transfer a listing may have tax consequences for UK residents investing in main market and 
AIM firms. This is because, unlike firms listed on the AIM, firms on the main market are 
eligible for inclusion in an Individual Savings Accounts (ISA). An ISA is a tax shelter 
available as an annual allowance for individuals resident in the UK. For example, in the 
fiscal year 2013/14 an individual could pay up to £11,520 into a stocks and shares ISA, 
although this limit was considerably less at the beginning of the study period. Gains realised 
on investments held in ISAs are free of capital gains tax and dividends are taxed at the basic 
rate regardless of the tax bracket of the investor. Although not eligible for inclusion within 
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an ISA investors in AIM firms enjoyed other generous tax benefits during the study period 
that were not available to investors in main market firms. These stem from a decision 
implemented in 2000 to treat firms listed on AIM as unquoted firms for tax purposes, 
producing benefits which include entrepreneurs’ relief against capital gains tax (CGT), 
enterprise investment scheme tax relief and inheritance tax business property relief, though 
these benefits were less valuable after 2008 due to changes in the UK tax code. The 
existence of these multiple incentives suggests that the tax motivation is likely to be more 
powerful for firms migrating down to the AIM, and this is borne out in the information 
provided in Table 1 where the stated motivation of achieving ‘tax benefits to investors’ is 
not mentioned by any firms moving up to the main market but is mentioned by 34 firms 
migrating down to the AIM. 
Relief against capital gains for investors moving down to the AIM is, however, only 
beneficial if investors are liable to CGT and is of no value for tax-exempt investors such as 
pension funds. The value of relief against inheritance tax depends upon whether individual 
investors foresee themselves as being liable to this tax, and even for such investors there are 
other well-established ways to reduce any potential liability. Further, the tax benefits of 
AIM investments are only of value to individuals who are subject to UK taxation. Though 
firms that switch their listing without providing adequate warning may trigger forced sales 
by investors with unforeseen tax liabilities, given the tax planning opportunities available to 
individuals to reduce the impact of such liabilities, and given that the AIM investor base 
comprises mainly institutional investors (Mendoza, 2008), we believe that any tax impact is 
likely to be negligible. Nevertheless, as one of our robustness checks we control for liquidity 
changes around listing migrations to take account of any unusual trading activity that might 
occur. 
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3. Theoretical background and hypotheses 
Firms may change their listing, or list on more than one exchange, when the group of 
investors with the greatest comparative advantage in assessing their value are based on a 
foreign exchange (the “investor recognition hypothesis” of Merton (1987)). Alternatively, a 
listing change may occur when a foreign exchange has a higher listing standard, thus 
allowing the firm to signal to potential investors that it is prepared to subject itself to higher 
standards of disclosure and corporate governance, thereby justifying a lower cost of capital 
(the “bonding hypothesis”, e.g. Coffee (1999)). A further possibility is that firms may 
change their listing when analyst coverage and the pool of potential investors is larger on 
another (usually foreign) exchange, resulting in greater liquidity and lower transaction costs 
(respectively, the “liquidity hypothesis” of Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and the “market 
segmentation” hypothesis of Kadlec and McConnell (1994)). 
Competing exchanges can either “race to the top” or “race to the bottom” when setting 
their listing requirements. Indeed regulatory arbitrage can work both ways as firms may 
“race to the top” in seeking listings on exchanges with more stringent corporate governance 
standards than found in their home country (Coffee 1999; Piotroski and Srinavasan 2008 
and Pagano et al. 2002). In fact, Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2006, p. 458) argue that “high 
reputation” exchanges are likely to reinforce their comparative advantage by setting high 
listing standards, while “low reputation” exchanges will set lower standards and become 
lower-tier markets.   
It is also probable that firms with concentrated ownership are inclined to avoid listing on 
exchanges where greater rights are afforded to minority shareholders Coffee (1999, p. 703). 
According to this reasoning the AIM is likely to be favoured over the main market by firms 
with concentrated ownership not least due to the absence of free float restrictions on AIM 
firms. 
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The decision to alter listing status may also be influenced by the additional financial 
disclosures required on a more regulated exchange as these serve to bond a firm’s managers 
to its shareholders and thus reduce agency risk. However, smaller firms may have less wish 
to incur additional bonding costs. Likewise firms with controlling shareholders may not 
regard an increase in bonding costs to be worth the resulting reduction in agency risk. If 
increased bonding costs incurred by firms graduating to the main market are outweighed by 
a lower cost of capital, asset pricing theory suggests that their stock prices should rise and 
subsequent expected returns should fall on the announcement of such a switch. This is 
because the risk premium declines to reflect the lower agency risk as investors’ uncertainty 
regarding the magnitude of agency costs is moderated due to an official listing. This leads to 
our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1.  Firm value will increase immediately following the announcement 
and transfer of firms from the AIM to the main market, followed by subsequent lower 
returns.   
On the other hand, firms transferring down from the main market to the AIM might be 
expected to initially suffer a stock price fall, but eventually the additional risk premium 
required to compensate for the higher agency risk of the less regulated market should result 
in higher returns, in equilibrium. This reasoning generates our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2. Firm value will decrease immediately following the announcement 
and transfer of firms from the main market to the AIM, followed by subsequent 
higher returns. 
4. Characteristics of the data 
Firm names, announcement dates and implementation dates of listing changes were 
obtained from the London Stock Exchange “New Issues and IPO Summary” spreadsheet 
(London Stock Exchange 2011b) and the NexisUK database of aggregated regulatory news 
from the London Stock Exchange. Close to close trading day periods are used to measure 
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total daily shareholder, industry sector, market and risk free returns. Therefore, in all 
subsequent discussions trading days are referred to simply as days and daily returns are the 
returns achieved over a close to close period. For all firms, daily excess returns over the 
contemporaneous risk free rate of interest were calculated by geometric differencing.
5
  
Market excess returns are proxied by the capitalization weighted average excess returns of 
the FTSE AIM All Share Index and the FTSE All Share Index returns. Additional control 
variables include the small firm premium (SMB) calculated by taking the geometric 
difference of the FTSE Small Cap Index and the FTSE 100 Index daily total returns; the 
value premium (VMG) calculated as the geometric difference between the FTSE Value 
Style Index and the FTSE Growth Style Index; daily trading volume for each firm in the 
sample; the daily closing bid-ask spread for each firm in the sample; the number of shares 
outstanding and finally the percentage free float for each firm in the sample from the 19
th
 
April 2002 when it first became available on Thomson Reuters DataStream. 
Firms were sorted into two groups, those transferring from the AIM to the main market 
(AIM2MAIN) and those transferring from the main market to the AIM (MAIN2AIM). Our 
sample period began in January 1996 and ended in December 2010, although there were no 
switches until 1997.   
Figure 1 shows that the number of AIM2MAIN firms peaked in 1998 and subsequently 
declined to a trough of just 2 firms in 2005 before increasing again in 2007 and 2008. The 
number of MAIN2AIM firms moving in the opposite direction peaked in 2003 before 
declining in 2009 to the lowest level since 1996. Between 2000 and 2006 the number of 
MAIN2AIM migrations exceeded the number of AIM2MAIN migrations, a pattern reversed 
with the onset of the financial crisis in 2007. The number of firms moving in each direction 
does not correspond with general fluctuations in the stock market. The peak of MAIN2AIM 
migrations occurred in 2003 when the market reached a low point, and the number of 
                                                 
5
 UK Treasury Bill Tender 3 Month Yield Middle Rate, (DataStream Code UKTBTND). 
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AIM2MAIN migrations subsequently increased relative to MAIN2AIM during the onset of 
the financial crisis in 2007 and remained higher through 2010, the final year of the study.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
4.1. AIM2MAIN firms 
After excluding foreign firms, firms with missing data and firms with non UK ISIN 
numbers, we are left with a sample of 111 firms which migrated from the AIM to main 
market. The reasons given by firms in their announcements for transferring their listing are 
summarized in Table 1. The statements of 42% of the AIM2MAIN firms do not contain any 
justification of the re-listing decision. The migrations of 40 of the remaining firms coincides 
with a positive growth forecast or statement that the main market is now appropriate given 
the firm’s size, 39 believe it will raise their profile, 36 believe a move to the main market 
will increase their shareholder base,  and 30 explicitly state an expected improvement in 
liquidity among their motivations. Other reasons given include better regulation, easier to 
enact mergers and acquisitions, better analyst coverage and ability to attract talented 
personnel. 
In Table 2, it is reported that the majority of AIM2MAIN firms are from the DataStream 
consumer services sector (24) followed closely by financials (31), industrials (18), 
technology (14) and healthcare (11). The remaining five sectors – oil and gas, telecoms, 
utilities, basic materials and consumer goods - comprise a total of just 13 firms. Of the 111 
firms in the sample, the median number of trading days between the announcement of a 
listing change and its enactment (implementation lag) is 39, the maximum is 607 and the 
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minimum is 0 (one firm only: Staffware.
6
 The median market capitalization on the 
implementation day is £122.5m and the maximum is £1.1bn. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
4.2. MAIN2AIM firms 
After excluding foreign firms, firms with missing data and firms with non UK ISIN 
numbers, we are left with a sample of 262 firms which migrated from the main to the AIM 
section, including MDY Healthcare which is entered twice because it moved from the main 
market to the AIM, back to the main market and then back to the AIM a second time. From 
Table 1, it is evident that 16% of MAIN2AIM firms, compared to 42% of AIM2MAIN 
firms, do not feel the need to justify their move to shareholders. Half of the firms state that 
the migration will facilitate the growth of the firm and that the new market is more 
appropriate for the firm’s size. More favourable regulation is also frequently cited as a 
motivation for the 48% of the MAIN2AIM group. General flexibility regarding corporate 
transactions is mentioned in 40% of the statements justifying migration, while about 11% 
mention some form of restructuring process. 
Examination of Table 2 reveals that the median implementation lag is 23 days which is 
quicker than the 39 day median observed in the AIM2MAIN sample. Two firms moved just 
ten days from the announcement day.
7
 A short implementation lag is potentially damaging 
                                                 
6
 Under AIM Rule 41 “An AIM company which wishes the Exchange to cancel admission of its AIM securities 
must notify the Exchange of its preferred cancellation date at least twenty business days prior to such date and 
save where the Exchange otherwise agrees, the cancellation shall be conditional upon the consent of not less 
than 75% of votes cast by its shareholders given in a general meeting.” However, in the case of firms moving 
from the AIM to the main market, firms can seek a waiver of rule 41 from the AIM regulation team of the 
London Stock Exchange. Waivers are considered on a case by case basis. This was confirmed by a telephone 
conversation by the author with a representative of the AIM regulation team on the 21
st
 of August 2008. 
7
 As applicable at August 2008, under UKLA rule 5.2.5 par. 2 a firm must obtain prior approval of a resolution 
for cancellation of not less than 75% of shareholders at a general meeting. Firms must also inform 
shareholders that the resolution for cancellation has been passed within 20 days following the date of the 
resolution and inform them of the intended date of cancellation. However, both UKLA rules 5.2.7 and 5.2.12 
outline situations where rule 5.2.5 does not apply and firms are only required to provide advance notice of 20 
business days before the intended cancellation of listing. In addition, a conversation between one of the 
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for private investors who may not be aware of the weaker shareholder protection 
mechanisms available on the AIM, particularly in situations where the requirements for a 
consultation period and shareholder approval for a delisting from the main market to the 
AIM are waived. It is also evident from Table 2 that the distribution of firms between 
sectors is somewhat different in the MAIN2AIM compared to the AIM2MAIN sample. The 
sector containing the most firms is industrials (79) followed by consumer services (44), 
consumer goods (41), technology (41) and financials (32). The remaining five sectors – 
basic materials, utilities, telecoms, oil and gas and healthcare – comprise 24 firms. 
At £9m the implementation day median market capitalization is much lower for the 
MAIN2AIM firms than the £123m median observed for the AIM2MAIN firms. This is 
consistent with the findings of Gerakos, Lang and Maffet (2013) to the effect that 
AIM2MAIN firms are likely to have exhibited recent growth and good performance while 
MAIN2AIM firms are likely to have exhibited poor performance and retrenchment. 
4.3. Survival record of switching firms 
A substantial proportion of both groups of firms ceased trading after their listing change, 
as summarized in Table 3.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------- 
Of the 111 AIM2MAIN firms, a total of 52% were classified by DataStream as no longer 
in existence by 4
th
 March 2011. Of all the AIM2MAIN firms, 41% survived for more than 5 
years after migration and a clear majority survived for more than 3 years. The post 
implementation survival of the MAIN2AIM firms is similar to the AIM2MAIN counterparts 
as a total 52% of firms are classified as dead by the end of the study period. The rate at 
                                                                                                                                                      
authors and a member of the technical team at the UKLA on the 22
nd
 August 2008 indicated that in exceptional 
circumstances, the requirement of a minimum of 20 business days of notice may also be waived. Nonetheless, 
Jenkinson and Ramadorai (2012) report that the rules were applied more rigorously from 2007 onwards and 
indeed, we find that from the beginning of 2007 the minimum implementation lag increased to 38 trading days 
and the median to 39 days. 
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which MAIN2AIM firms die over the study period is similar to that of the AIM2MAIN 
sample and the majority of firms survive for 5 years or more, following migration.  
4.4. Choice of event date 
Standard event studies aim to capture the value of price sensitive information released on 
the event date which is reflected in the difference between the realized return and the 
expected return, based upon a return-generating model.   
Many of the listing change announcements coincide with the release of other price 
sensitive information, such as annual results, interim results, fundraisings, trading 
statements and takeover bids. We hypothesize that promotions to the main market from 
AIM are likely to be associated with positive news, while transfers from the main market to 
the AIM are likely to be associated with unfavourable news, reflecting the possibility that a 
listing change may be a symptom rather than a cause of firm performance. Hence, we are 
able to make useful inferences about the overall health of firms making the respective 
announcements, both as reported on the announcement day and in the period leading up to 
the announcement by studying their price reaction on the announcement date. 
We found little evidence of firms releasing additional price sensitive information on the 
implementation date, making this date ‘clean’ of confounding events. Implementation 
conveys the removal of the uncertainty, or execution risk. In the case of AIM2MAIN firms, 
it is also confirmation of the ability to meet the listing requirements of the main market. An 
event study based on the implementation date is also able to capture the effects of changes 
in liquidity arising as different categories of investors move into or out of a firm’s stock 
around the migration date.  
5. Hypothesis testing and results 
5.1. Returns surrounding listing migrations  
It is evident from Table 1 that a frequently cited motivation for a listing switch is to 
improve liquidity. Furthermore, switching firms are often small relative to the average size 
22 
 
of firms listed on the LSE; they may be in high growth sectors; they may have higher or 
lower sensitivity to market risk than average; or they may have a higher or lower trading 
volume relative to similar firms. Therefore, in order to control for firm and time specific 
factors we specify our return generating model I for which independent variables are 
identified in the left column of Table 4. Least squared coefficients for model I are estimated 
for each firm, with individual excess returns used as the dependent variable. Time series 
data from 250 days prior to the announcement through to 250 days after the implementation 
date, the end of the study period, or the firm death date, whichever is first, are used to 
estimate the coefficients. Event day abnormal returns are captured using dummy variables 
for the announcement date and implementation date. The long run pre implementation and 
post implementation change to the agency risk premium are captured by the model intercept 
and intercept dummy variable coefficients respectively. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------- 
Consistent with our two hypotheses, the results in Table 4 show that the announcement 
day abnormal return dummy variable coefficient is positive and significant at the p < 0.05 
level for the AIM2MAIN group but negative and significant at the p < 0.01 level for the 
MAIN2AIM group. The signs of the implementation day abnormal return dummy variable 
coefficients are also consistent with our hypotheses, although only the MAIN2AIM sample 
is significant at the p < 0.05 level. Likewise, the mean coefficients on the intercept dummy 
variables are negative for the AIM2MAIN sample and positive for the MAIN2AIM sample 
in line with our hypotheses, while the test statistics are significant at the p < 0.01 and p < 
0.05 levels respectively. Thus on a risk adjusted basis, the value of firms transferring to the 
main market increases immediately following the announcement and transfer to the main 
market, but subsequent risk adjusted returns are negative as in hypothesis one. In contrast, 
the value of firms transferring to the AIM market decreases immediately following the 
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announcement and implementation but subsequent returns are positive as predicted by 
hypothesis two. These findings are consistent with those of Tse and Davos (2004) with 
respect to AMEX – NASDAQ – AMEX migrations.  
Examination of the control variable coefficients reported in Table 4 shows that in the 
AIM2MAIN sample the interaction dummy variable coefficient testing for changes in firms’ 
sensitivity to the market return post implementation is not significant, while for the 
MAIN2AIM sample the coefficient is negative and significant, at the p < 0.05 level. This 
indicates that MAIN2AIM firms’ sensitivities to market returns, i.e. betas, decline post 
migration. This finding mirrors that of Bacman et al. (2002) who observe increases in 
market risk for firms that migrate up to the senior segment of the French stock exchange. 
We argue that market risk becomes less relevant than agency risk when firms migrate to 
AIM. This is because AIM firms often have low liquidity and concentrated ownership, so 
they arguably have more in common with private equity than firms on the main market and 
as a consequence issues of control rights are of greater importance. Bonding is lower for 
AIM firms, with the result that agency risk is higher, creating uncertainty - although this 
uncertainty is not necessarily observable in the form of stock price volatility. Nonetheless, 
the uncertainty is priced by a return premium that results in higher total shareholder returns 
following the downward migration.  
To summarize, in hypotheses (1) and (2) we argue that the two sections of the LSE 
constitute different bonding regimes. Firms migrating between the two regimes are 
subjected to a change in bonding obligations that directly cause a change in the level of 
agency risk faced by their minority investors. In other words, in the low bonding regime of 
the AIM, agency risk is high. Conversely agency risk is low in the high bonding regime of 
the main section of the LSE. We test our hypotheses using the general specification of return 
generating model I. This controls for the market, firm size and the book to market risk 
factors of Fama and French (1993); industry risk; the possible influence of changes in 
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liquidity during the pre and post event period on the return generating process (Liu 2006)
8
; 
and the possibility that return generating model parameters such as the intercept and market 
risk may differ before and after the implementation date (see for example, Baker and 
Edelman 1992a; Bacmann et al. 2002; Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino 2010). Following 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985), the bid-ask-spread variable controls for both liquidity and 
time variation in information asymmetry. Thus, by a process of eliminating other possible 
causes, we attribute the abnormal returns isolated by our model to changes in the agency 
risk premium resulting from switches between the two bonding regimes. 
In order to mitigate the potential thin-trading biases identified by Dimson (1979) and 
others, the specification of model I also includes lagged firm returns, lagged market excess 
returns and lagged size and style factors. Both groups of firms, but especially firms in the 
MAIN2AIM sample, frequently experience days when no trading occurs. Therefore, we 
implement an additional mitigation for thin-trading that, to the best of our knowledge, has 
not been implemented in prior research. Specifically, we substitute market excess returns for 
firm excess returns on days when both of the following two conditions are met 
simultaneously: (a) a firm’s stock price does not change and (b) its trading volume is zero. 
These two conditions amount to missing data, because on zero volume days a return of zero 
does not necessarily reflect the return an investor could have made had they attempted to 
trade. Hence we refer to such days as ‘no-price days’ (NPDs). Our substitution is motivated 
by the principle that the least biased substitute for missing firm level data is likely to be the 
market excess return. We also encounter missing data related to free float and the bid-ask 
spread:  for free float data we substitute 100% for the missing value, while for bid-ask 
spread data we substitute the mean bid-ask spread observed for that firm over the 501 day 
event period. 
                                                 
8
 Our approach differs from that of Liu (2006) in that our model I includes contemporaneous and lagged 
changes in bid ask spread and scaled trading volume, whereas Liu constructs a liquidity risk factor from the 
return differential between portfolios of low and high liquidity stocks defined according to a liquidity metric. 
Thus, our method allows for greater time series variation in liquidity within firms. 
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5.2. Robustness tests 
We carried out a number of robustness checks of the results reported in Table 4, 
including: (1) not substituting market returns for firm returns on days when no trading or 
price change occurred; (2) excluding  firms in which the total trading volume in the year 
prior to implementation was less than 3% of shares outstanding; (3) varying the 
specification of model I to include additional lags on the control variables; (4) omitting non-
significant control variables such as the free float; (5) imposing winsorizations of 2.5% on 
each tail; (6) partitioning the data into quartiles of calendar time for implementation dates, 
quartiles of market capitalization and quartiles of average bid-ask spread one year prior to 
implementation. In all of our robustness checks we obtained qualitatively similar results 
with consistent coefficient signs on the key variables of interest, although significance levels 
naturally vary. 
Of course notwithstanding these robustness tests, it is possible that other factors might 
explain the returns which we attribute to changes in agency risk. In a further effort to 
investigate competing explanations for our results we undertake a cross sectional analysis 
using a second model. Dependent variables for model II are chosen on the premise that the 
key relationships of interest in model I are represented by the coefficients on the following 
variables: (a) the intercept, showing the model-adjusted daily average returns; (b) the 
intercept dummy variable showing incremental average daily returns observed post 
implementation (i.e. the change in the agency risk premium); and (c) a separate dummy 
variable recording the announcement day and implementation day abnormal returns 
respectively. As systematic variations between firms may not be captured by the averaging 
of model I coefficients reported in Table 4, we undertake a cross sectional analysis of the 
above four key coefficients from model I. This is achieved by setting each coefficient as the 
dependent variable in four variations of a cross sectional regression of model II.  
The independent variables in model II are listed in Tables 5 and 6 for the two groups of 
firms respectively. For each firm they include: the model I coefficients other than the 
26 
 
respective dependent variable in model II; the market value percentile rank on the 
implementation day relative to the whole sample migration category; the average bid-ask 
spread percentage over the period t – 255 through t – 6; the standardized daily trading volume; 
the average free float percentage over the period t – 255 through t – 6 and the implementation 
lag in trading days. In addition, we include dummy variables identifying whether or not 
other information such as financial results were disclosed on the announcement date; 
whether additional capital was raised at the time of the migration and whether shareholders 
were given a vote on the proposed migration; and dummy variables identifying the stated 
motivation for the migration, as described in Table 1. 
The basic premise of model II is that there may be associations between firm 
characteristics and the abnormal returns identified using model I. Investigation of between-
firm variation in model I coefficients with the aid of a cross sectional regression allows a 
richer exploration of the data than a panel estimation using either fixed or random effects. 
This is because the cross sectional regression takes into account between firm variations in 
both slope and intercept coefficients in model I. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------- 
Examination of Tables 5 and 6 confirm that for both groups of firms, relatively few of the 
coefficients in model II are significant at the p < 0.10 level or less and the low adjusted R
2
 
values indicate that overall, the variables in model II explain little of the abnormal returns 
identified in model I. In other words, the results of model II do not support competing 
explanations to our bonding and agency risk theories underpinning hypotheses (1) and (2). 
Nonetheless, the model II coefficients that are significant at the < 0.10 level or less indicate 
that for the AIM2MAIN sample, firms which exhibit the greatest pre-implementation 
abnormal returns undergo the greatest reversal in fortunes following implementation, as 
evidenced by the negative relationship between the model I intercept dummy and model I 
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intercept coefficients, significant at p < 0.05. In a study of firms seeking promotion from the 
American Stock Exchange (AMEX) to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), Baker and 
Edelman (1992a) observe a similar pre migration rise in firm values and a post migration 
fall. Comparable results with respect to upward migrations on the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
(TSE) are found by Lamba and Arif (1997). 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------- 
Corresponding model II coefficients for the MAIN2AIM sample are reported in Table 6. 
Even fewer of the model II coefficients are significant and the adjusted R
2
 values are lower 
still, further reducing the potential for competing explanations for the abnormal returns 
observed in model I. Overall, the weak significance of the model II coefficients with respect 
to MAIN2AIM is reassuring as it implies that most of the relevant information is captured 
by model I, with little new information added by model II.  
In sections 2 and 4 we also mention that tax differences between the two segments might 
result in trading around listing migrations as different tax clienteles of investors move into 
or out of the migrating firm in order to benefit from or avoid losing tax reliefs as a result of 
the migration. Of course it is possible that tax, or similar clientele related changes in the 
investor base of firms, may result in the abnormal returns observed. However, if this is the 
case, the results appear somewhat counter intuitive given that loss of the reliefs available to 
firms migrating from the AIM to the main section might be expected to result in 
shareholders exiting the firm and prices being depressed prior to the migration. In fact, our 
results appear to be the opposite, leading us to suggest that changes in agency risk outweigh 
any tax clientele effects that may result from the switch. Arguably, our results are 
strengthened by the fact that the tax benefits of a migration to AIM do not counterbalance 
the negative influence of increased agency risk. It is also worth noting that the stated 
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motivation of achieving ‘tax benefits to investors’ for firms migrating down to the AIM is 
not significant in the results reported in Table 6. Furthermore, our model I specification 
indirectly controls for transitory changes in liquidity around the listing migrations by 
including variables that capture time series changes in three liquidity proxies. Therefore, we 
are confident that the returns that we attribute to differences in bonding and agency risk 
exist after controlling for trading activity resulting from clientele changes in the investor 
base. 
6. Summary and conclusions 
After controlling for firm size, market, style, industry and liquidity, we find that firms 
graduating from the AIM to the main section of the LSE generate positive returns on the day 
the decision is announced. For firms moving in the opposite direction, corresponding returns 
are negative. It thus appears that announcements of the intention to move up and down are 
associated with good and bad news, respectively. After the listing change is implemented, 
the pattern is reversed for both categories of firm so that firms moving up earn lower returns 
while firms moving down earn higher returns. For firms transferring down from the main 
market to the AIM, we argue that the improved performance post implementation is a 
reward to shareholders for bearing increased levels of agency risk. In contrast, because 
investors value the higher bonding requirements of the main market, firms transferring up to 
the main market experience positive returns on the announcement days but subsequently 
have lower returns that reflect the lower cost of equity capital as a result of reduced agency 
risk. The fact that post migration returns are abnormal, i.e. persisting after comprehensively 
controlling for other risk factors, implies that the remaining agency risk earns a return 
premium additional to that attributable to these other factors. 
Our conclusions are subject to the caveat that we have not measured the relationship 
between bonding cost and firm performance directly. However, we mitigate this concern by 
including a wide variety of control variables to eliminate competing explanations for our 
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results. Our controls demonstrate that liquidity changes do not account for the changes in 
firm valuation and returns surrounding migrations. Likewise, examination of the survival 
rates of switching firms provides little evidence that differences in bankruptcy rates, pre and 
post migration, are a competing explanation for our results.  
Our results have important economic implications. The tradeoff between agency risk and 
bonding costs is relevant to firm managers when determining an appropriate listing venue; 
investors weighing up the implications of an investee firm’s listing choice; and regulators 
determining appropriate mechanisms of regulatory oversight. Our results indicate that this 
trade-off determines the switching decision. They also demonstrate the importance of 
controlling for time series variations in liquidity in return generating models to remove 
potential omitted variable bias. Bearing in mind both the changes in firm valuation and cost 
of capital arising as a result of listing changes, these findings are relevant to both AIM and 
main market investors. More than double the number of firms moved down to the AIM from 
the main market as moved in the opposite direction. The median size of firms transferring to 
the main market is thirteen and a half times larger than firms moving down to the AIM. 
Hence it seems plausible that firms moving down have reached a size at which the 
additional bonding costs of maintaining a main market listing are no longer outweighed by 
the reduced cost of capital arising from the lower agency risks of a main market listing. 
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Table 1 
Justifications for a Change of Listing 
Justification Category 
AIM2MAIN  
No. & % 
MAIN2AIM  
No. & % 
No justification 47 42.3% 41 15.6% 
Growth and/or appropriate for firm's size 40 36.0% 131 49.8% 
Raised profile of company or market 39 35.1% 6 2.3% 
Increase investor base 36 32.4% 20 7.6% 
Improve liquidity/appropriate for current liquidity 30 27.0% 12 4.6% 
Placing/capital raising concurrent with switch 11 9.9% 38 14.4% 
Ease of future capital raising 4 3.6% 14 5.3% 
Ease of future acquisitions 2 1.8% 38 14.4% 
Attract staff 2 1.8% 1 0.4% 
Cost savings, simplification of reporting/regulation 0 0 127 48.3% 
General flexibility regarding corporate transactions 0 0 105 39.9% 
Tax benefits for investors 0 0 34 12.9% 
Restructuring/refocusing/refinancing/write down 0 0 28 10.6% 
Violates minimum 25% free-float rule, or similar 0 0 17 6.5% 
SuiTable for existing investor base 0 0 15 5.7% 
High proportion of private investors 0 0 4 1.5% 
Shareholder protection statement 0 0 37 14.1% 
Total number of justifications in each sample 164  616  
Total number of firms in each sample 111  262  
Average proportion of total justification categories NA 18.5% NA 15.0% 
Maximum proportion of total justification categories NA 87.5% NA 53.3% 
AIM2MAIN firms are those that transfer from the AIM to the main market. MAIN2AIM firms are those 
transferring in the opposite direction. The first announcement of the intended change of listing was 
searched for a statement justifying the change. Statements were then grouped into the categories 
identified below, the titles of which record the meaning of, or paraphrase, the justifications provided by 
the individual firms. Some firms gave multiple justifications; hence, the total number of justifications in 
each sample is greater than the total number of firms despite the fact that 42.3% of AIM2MAIN and 
15.6% of MAIN2AIM firms do not give any justification. The average disclosure proportion reflects the 
average of the number of justifications given by each firm divided by the total number of justification 
categories identified below. The category “shareholder protection statement” records firms in the 
MAIN2AIM sample that found it necessary to reassure investors that their interests would not be 
adversely affected by the switch. 
  
38 
 
Table 2 
Characteristics of Transferring Firms 
Firm Characteristics AIM2MAIN No. & % MAIN2AIM No. & % 
Total  111 (100%) 262 (100%) 
Consumer Services   24 (22%) 44 (17%) 
Financials   31 (28%) 32 (12%) 
Industrials   18 (16%) 79  (30%) 
Technology   14 (13%) 41 (16%) 
Healthcare   11 (10%) 11 (4%) 
Oil & Gas   5 (5%) 4 (2%) 
Telecom   3 (3%) 3 (1%) 
Utilities   3 (3%) 0 (0%) 
Basic Materials   1 (1%) 6 (2%) 
Consumer Goods   1 (1%) 41 (16%) 
Min. Imp. lag  
25th percentile of the Imp. lag 
50th percentile of the Imp. lag 
75th percentile of the Imp. lag 
Max. Imp. Lag 
Min. Mkt. Cap. Imp. Day 
25th percentile of the Mkt. Cap. Imp. Day 
50th percentile of the Mkt. Cap. Imp. Day 
75th percentile of the Mkt. Cap. Imp. Day 
Max. Mkt. Cap. Imp. Day 
Min. Av. BAS t – 255 through t – 6 
25th percentile of Av. BAS t – 255 through t – 6 
50th percentile of Av. BAS t – 255 through t – 6 
75th percentile of Av. BAS t – 255 through t – 6 
Max. Av. BAS t – 255 through t – 6 
Min. NPD Proportion, t – 255 through t – 6 
25th percentile NPD Proportion, t – 255 through t – 6 
50th percentile NPD Proportion, t – 255 through t – 6 
75th percentile NPD Proportion, t – 255 through t – 6 
Max. NPD Proportion, t – 255 through t – 6 
0 
20 
39 
115 
607 
£1.6m 
£49.6m 
£122.5 
£255.3 
£1,098m 
0.4% 
2.1% 
3.2% 
4.5% 
22.6% 
0 
0 
6.0% 
27.2% 
85.8% 
 10 
 21 
 23 
 40 
 201 
 £0.3m 
 £4.7m 
 £9.1m 
 £19.7m 
 £338m 
 1.5% 
 6.0% 
 8.7% 
 12.1% 
 37.1% 
 0 
 6.8% 
 26.6% 
 58.4% 
 100% 
AIM2MAIN firms are those that migrate from the AIM to the main market. MAIN2AIM firms are those 
migrating in the opposite direction. Other abbreviations are as follows: number of observations (No.), 
largest observation (Max.), smallest observation (Min.), average (Av.), market capitalization (Mkt. Cap.), 
implementation (Imp.), bid-ask spread (BAS), no price days in which both trading volume and price 
changes are zero (NPD). 
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Table 3 
Firms Dying Between the Implementation Date and the 4
th
 March 2011 
Death period from implementation date AIM2MAIN MAIN2AIM 
Within 1 year (250 trading days)  2 (2%) 23 (9%) 
Between 1 and 2 years  15 (15%) 24 (9%) 
Between 2 and 3 years 5 (5%) 18 (7%) 
Between 3 and 5 years 14 (13%) 33 (13%) 
More than 5 years 46 (41%) 132 (50%) 
Moved < 5 years before 4
th
 March 2011 and 
alive at 4
th
 March 2011 
30 (27%) 33 (13%) 
Total deaths up to 4
th
 March 2011 58 (52%) 136 (52%) 
Total number of switching firms 111 (100%) 262 (100%) 
DataStream Death Category      
Delisted 4 (5%) 20 (8%) 
Suspended 3 (2%) 4 (2%) 
Taken Over 7 (6%) 11 (4%) 
Dead – dead (unclassified) 44 (40%) 101 (39%) 
Total (percentages rounded) 58 (52%) 136 (52%) 
AIM2MAIN firms are those that transfer from the AIM to the main market. MAIN2AIM firms 
are those transferring in the opposite direction. Death lag refers to the number of trading days 
between the implementation date and firm death. The final check for dead firms was made at 
the end of the study period on the 4
th
 March 2011. DataStream classifies firms which are 
inactive, but have not been taken over, suspended, or delisted, as ‘dead – dead’. 
  
40 
 
Table 4 
Return generating model I variables, coefficients and t - statistics 
Panel A: AIM2MAIN sample  
Independent variables 
Mean 
coefficient 
t - statistics 
Intercept (average model adjusted abnormal return) -0.001  -1.03 
Intercept dummy (change in abnormal return following implementation) -0.001  -2.63*** 
Announcement day average abnormal return (dummy variable) 0.022  2.53** 
Implementation day average abnormal return (dummy variable) 0.002  0.55 
Market interaction dummy variable 0.064  1.56 
Market excess return 0.991  16.59*** 
Market return lagged one period -0.051  -1.807* 
Small firm return minus large firm return (SMB)   0.541  10.88*** 
SMB lagged one period -0.011  -0.40 
Value firm return minus growth firm return (VMG) -0.114  -3.31*** 
VMG lagged one period -0.062  -1.87* 
Industry residual return 0.034  1.44 
Industry residual return lagged one period 0.014  0.87 
Change in % bid-ask spread -0.004  -4.70*** 
Volume of shares traded as a % shares outstanding 1.847  2.31** 
Free float percentage -0.000  -0.13 
Firm excess return lagged one period 0.075  7.57*** 
Panel B: MAIN2AIM sample  
Independent variables 
Mean 
coefficient 
t - statistic 
Intercept (average model adjusted abnormal return) -0.002  -1.03  
Intercept dummy (change in abnormal return following implementation) 0.001  2.10**  
Announcement day average abnormal return (dummy variable) -0.028  -2.98***  
Implementation day average abnormal return (dummy variable) -0.018  -2.27**  
Market interaction dummy variable -0.067  -2.29**  
Market excess return 0.830  25.67***  
Market return lagged one period 0.005  0.21  
Small firm return minus large firm return (SMB)   0.411  13.52***  
SMB lagged one period 0.040  1.88  
Value firm return minus growth firm return (VMG) -0.009  -0.30  
VMG lagged one period -0.031  -1.13  
Industry residual return -0.024  -1.12  
Industry residual return lagged one period 0.026  1.44  
Change in % bid-ask spread -0.012  -7.93***  
Volume of shares traded as a % shares outstanding 2.751  3.14***  
Free float percentage -0.001  -0.82  
Firm excess return lagged one period 0.043  6.35***  
AIM2MAIN firms are those that transfer from the AIM to the main market. MAIN2AIM firms 
are those transferring in the opposite direction. The dependent variable is the firm daily excess 
return. Least squares coefficient estimates are averaged across the respective samples. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively. 
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Table 5 
Cross sectional Model II coefficients: firms migrating to the main market, AIM2MAIN 
 
M. II coefficients & 
 
Dependent Variables 
Independent variables of model II M. I Int.  
M. I. Int. 
dummy. 
M. I 
Ann. Ab. 
M. I Imp. 
Ab. 
Intercept 0.004  0.002  -0.046  -0.034  
M. I intercept coefficient 
 
-0.059**  -0.974  -0.490  
M. I intercept dummy -1.223**  
 
-3.931  0.046  
M. I Announcement day Ab. return -0.020  -0.004  
 
0.015  
M. I implementation day Ab. return -0.057  0.000  0.083  
 
M. I Market coefficient -0.010*  -0.001  0.083**  -0.008  
M. I Market interaction coefficient -0.004  -0.002*  0.017  0.012  
M. I SMB coefficient 0.005  0.002  -0.074*  -0.005  
M. I VMG coefficient 0.000  0.002**  -0.025  -0.000  
Market value percentile rank on implementation day 0.003  -0.003*  -0.007  0.030  
Bid ask spread average percentage t - 255 through t - 6 -0.036  -0.020  -0.970**  0.407**  
Standardised volume, t – 255 through t – 6 -0.004  -0.001  0.040  -0.006  
Average free float, t – 255  through t – 6 0.006  0.002  -0.021  0.008  
Imp. lag in trading days -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  0.000  
Other information disclosed at time of announcement 0.006  0.000  0.016  0.014  
Placing / capital raising concurrent with migration -0.008  -0.001  -0.042  -0.018  
Shareholders allowed to vote on proposed migration -0.007  0.000  -0.003  0.010  
Stated Motivation for migration, defined in Table 1 
    
No motivation/justification given -0.004  -0.000  0.040  0.000  
Increase investor base -0.007  -0.000  0.031  0.001  
Improve liquidity / appropriate for current liquidity -0.002  0.000  -0.025  0.012  
Raised profile of company or product market 0.003  -0.001  0.028  -0.001  
Attract staff 0.003  -0.001  -0.059  0.019  
Growth and/or appropriate for firm's size -0.002  0.000  0.031  -0.009  
Adjusted R squared 6.7% 8.6% 9.3% 0.5% 
Coefficients for the cross sectional Model II in which dependent variables are the model I 
coefficients that identify abnormal returns, namely: intercept (Int.); intercept dummy variable 
representing the post implementation abnormal (agency risk premium) return; the 
announcement day abnormal return; and the implementation day abnormal return t. 
Abbreviations are: model I (M. I), model II (M.II), intercept (Int.) announcement day (Ann.), 
implementation day (Imp.), abnormal return (Ab.). Dummy variables include: other 
information disclosed at time of announcement; placing / capital raised at the time of 
migration; shareholders allowed to vote on proposed migration and; stated motivations for 
migration as defined in Table 1. The following symbols: ***, **, * indicate significance at: 
0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels respectively.  
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Table 6 
Cross sectional Model II coefficients: firms migrating to the AIM section, MAIN2AIM 
 
M. II coefficients 
 
& Dependent Variables 
Independent variables of model II M. I Int.  
M. I. Int. 
dummy. 
M. I 
Ann. 
Ab. 
M. I Imp. 
Ab. 
Intercept -0.001  0.001  -0.035  0.086**  
M. I intercept coefficient 
 
-0.014  0.136  0.097  
M. I intercept dummy -0.396  
  
-0.006  
M. I Announcement day Ab. return 0.005  -0.000  -0.060  -0.069  
M. I implementation day Ab. return 0.007  -0.000  -0.157  
 M. I Market coefficient 0.002  0.002  0.048  -0.008  
M. I Market interaction coefficient 0.003  0.000  0.031  0.000  
M. I SMB coefficient -0.009  -0.001  -0.048  0.009  
M. I VMG coefficient 0.000  0.001  -0.031  0.015  
Market value percentile rank on implementation day 0.002  -0.002  0.079*  -0.018  
Bid ask spread average percentage t - 255 through t - 6 0.020  -0.008  0.172  -0.142  
Standardised volume, t – 255 through t – 6 0.007*  0.001  -0.016  -0.020  
Average free float, t – 255  through t – 6 -0.003  -0.000  -0.062  -0.072***  
Imp. lag in trading days 0.000  0.000  -0.000  -0.000  
Other information disclosed at time of announcement -0.003  0.001  -0.007  -0.022  
Placing / capital raising concurrent with migration -0.003  -0.000  -0.011  0.002  
Shareholders allowed to vote on proposed migration 0.000  0.002  -0.024  0.032  
Stated Motivation for migration, defined in Table 1 
    Shareholder protection statement (MAIN2AIM only) -0.007  0.000  -0.039  0.008**  
Increase investor base 0.013*  0.000  -0.006  0.036  
Improve liquidity / appropriate for current liquidity -0.012  -0.001  0.026  0.002  
Raised profile of company or product market -0.004  -0.000  0.087  0.032  
Attract staff -0.019  -0.000  -0.079  -0.017  
Growth and/or appropriate for firm's size -0.002  -0.000  -0.001  -0.002  
Cost savings, simplification of reporting / regulation 0.001  0.000  0.007  -0.012  
Suitable for existing investor base 0.022***  -0.000  0.048  0.057  
General flexibility regarding corporate transactions 0.000  -0.001  0.022  -0.007  
Ease of future acquisitions -0.003  -0.000  -0.011  -0.000  
Ease of future capital raising 0.008  -0.002  -0.039  0.049  
Restructuring/refocusing/refinancing/write-down -0.008  0.001  -0.040  0.013  
Tax benefits for investors 0.005  0.001  -0.005  -0.005  
Violates the minimum 25% free float rule, or similar 0.002  -0.003** -0.086*  -0.002  
Adjusted R squared -0.5% 2.3% 1.2% -1.3% 
Coefficients for the cross sectional Model II in which dependent variables are the model I 
coefficients that identify abnormal returns, namely: intercept (Int.); intercept dummy variable 
representing the change in agency risk premium post implementation; the announcement day 
abnormal return; and the implementation day abnormal return t. Abbreviations are: model I (M. 
I), model II (M.II), intercept (Int.) announcement day (Ann.), implementation day (Imp.), 
abnormal return (Ab.). Dummy variables include: other information disclosed at time of 
announcement; placing / capital raised at the time of migration; shareholders allowed to vote 
on proposed migration and; stated motivations for migration as defined in Table 1. The 
following symbols: ***, **, * indicate significance at: 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels respectively.  
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Figure 1  
Number of firms migrating in each year of the study period 
AIM2MAIN firms are those that transfer from the AIM to the main market.  
MAIN2AIM firms are those transferring in the opposite direction. Our sample 
began in 1996 although no firms migrated that year. Source: London Stock 
Exchange New Issues and IPO Summary (LSE 2011b). 
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